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In this paper we describe a practical solution towards anony-
mous and verifiable databases based on the use of smartcards 
and the recent Improved Leighton-Micali protocol for the 
distribution of keys. The scheme is addressed particularly to 
public data held in separate government databases with the 
aim of preventing unauthorized government institutions from 
gathering and merging private data concerning individuals 
from these separate containers. The solution can be realized 
through the recent Clipper Chip and smartcard technology, 
and its security relies on the strength of these technologies. 
The scheme is also extendible to mobile computing 
environments. 
Keywords: Security and protection, Database management, 
Network protocols. 
1. Introduction 
Security of public data represents an issue which is increasingly becoming important and rele-
vant to all individuals within society. Public data 
can range from statistics which bear no direct 
impact on any given individual in society, to med-
0167-4048/95/$9.50 © 1995, Elsevier Science Ltd 
ical and financial information whose disclosure 
may affect an individual's standing within society. 
In traditional paper-based societies the gathering 
of such personal information concerning a partic-
ular individual was difficult to perform due to the 
shear amount of manual work involved. Hence, 
only certain government bodies could afford such 
data gathering based on some legal warrant. 
In today's computerized world the collection and 
transfer of voluminous amounts of information 
over wide geographic distances has been accepted 
as a common everyday occurrence. With recent 
advances in fibre optics technology, the notion of 
superhighways for data is becoming a reality. With 
this increasing ease at which voluminous data can 
be transferred and the increasing speed of data 
processing systems, the capacity for data gathering 
and intelligent computerized processing has also 
been significantly increased. These advances, 
which are beneficial to society from one point of 
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view, have raised questions from the opposite 
point of view, namely, of whether such comput-
ing power can be misused against society both by 
certain individuals within the society and by the 
very government upon which members of society 
have placed their trust. Accepting that for the 
functioning of a society some trust must be placed 
by the society on its government, a method of 
assurance must still be used to guarantee that an 
individual's personal details, which are spread 
across different government institutions, cannot 
be illegally gathered and merged together to give a 
total picture of that individual's private life. 
One of the earliest efforts directed into finding 
possible solutions to this problem is that by 
Brandt et al. [1]. This effort recognized that data-
bases belonging to different institutions must pro-
vide to the individual users the properties of the 
users being anonymous and the databases being ver-
ifiable. More specifically, when different data items 
are given by an individual to these distinct and 
separate institutions, these data items should not 
be identifiable by others as having come from the 
one same individual. The true identity of each 
individual must remain unknown to other indi-
viduals and to each institution. Each individual 
must also have the ability to verifY that his or her 
personal details held by an institution are correct. 
In the current work we investigate the issue of 
anonymous and verifiable databases in the context 
of recent developments in tamper-proof hardware, 
with the aim of presenting some practical solu-
tions to the need of such databases. Our approach 
is founded on the use of smartcard technology 
coupled with an improved version of the recent 
Leighton-Micali key distribution protocol [2, 3]. 
In the next section we discuss the motivations of 
the current work, with the aim of placing Brandt's 
work [1] in our context. This is followed in Sec-
tion 3 by the description of the scheme, focusing 
on the Improved Leighton-Micali protocol and 
on the issues of anonymity, data storage and data 
verifiability. Section 4 closes with some brief 
remarks and conclusions. 
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2. Motivations 
The need of a practical scheme to realize the 
notion of anonymous and verifiable databases is 
becoming self-evident in computerized nations. 
One recent example in Australia was the public 
debate over the Australian Identity Card [4] by 
which every Australian resident would be assigned 
a unique number as an identifYing piece of infor-
mation. This number would then be used as a 
pointer to cross-reference data in various govern-
ment institutions which held information con-
cerning the owner of the number. Although this 
move by the government was defeated, in actuality 
the government later proceeded to use the cit-
izens' taxation file numbers more or less as a sub-
stitute for the proposed identity card. 
One important recent development in the United 
States which has again brought the debate about 
citizens' right to privacy into the foreground is the 
introduction of the Clipper Chip [5, 6] and its 
related technology. The Clipper Chip is a high-
speed and high-security encryption device to be 
used by the US Government for its telephone and 
other networking equipment. The chip has a clas-
sified encipherment algorithm and contains a 
secret key. Through a 'key-escrow' system an 
appointed government agency can obtain a legal 
warrant to wiretap communications between any 
two parties that are using the device. The main 
idea behind this notion is to provide secure com-
munications to the users of the Chip against 
external attacks, while at the same time allowing 
the government to monitor communications that 
are suspected of being a threat to national security 
or to society in general (e.g. drug traffickers, 
industrial espionage). 
This paper extends the notions embodied in the 
Clipper Chip concept towards another area, 
namely that of providing ways to achieve anony-
mous and verifiable databases. We require the 
appointed agency or authority to be a trusted 
adjudicator between the members of society and 
the other ordinary government institutions. In this 
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way sensItIve data concerning citizens in general 
may be guarded against illegal access while data 
concerning suspected citizens can be made readily 
available to the appointed authority. In the follow-
ing discussion we will denote the appointed gov-
ernment agency as the Trusted Authority (TA). We 
assume that each institution holds a database con-
taining every individual's details which are rele-
vant to the functioning of the institution. Any 
exchange of data between departments must be 
through the Trusted Authority who regulates as to 
which details are exchangeable and who enforces 
the chosen policies. Thus, for example, the taxa-
tion department holds taxation-related informa-
tion, while the health department has a health 
record of individuals that obtain medical service 
from the government hospitals. An individual is 
able to submit new details to each institution, 
respectively, and each individual can query each 
database independently without his or her identity 
being revealed. 
Each individual has the duty to initially enrol 
himself or herself to the Trusted Authority, bring-
ing their personal identification information (e.g. 
birth certificate, retina scan, fingerprint, DNA 
sequence). The Trusted Authority creates a pseu-
donym [1] for an individual corresponding to each 
institution that holds data about the individual. 
Hence, an individual has a different pseudonym 
when dealing with each institution. For each indi-
vidual, the Trusted Authority issues a tamper-
proof smartcard containing that individual's set of 
pseudonyms and other cryptographic parameters. 
For a given institution, the Trusted Authority also 
issues cryptographic parameters which are stored 
in the tamper-proof smartcard belonging to an 
appointed trusted local authority (person) who is a 
representative of the institution (e.g. system 
administrator). Unlike the identity of individuals, 
each institution has a unique identity which is 
published. 
The database at each institution is assumed to be 
managed by a trusted DBMS which can be used 
by staff members at the site only through a num-
ber of tamper-free terminals [7, 8]. These tamper-
free terminals represent the only valid access 
points to the database. A number of tamper-free 
terminals are also provided at the site for use by 
visiting individuals in the public, while remote 
tamper-free terminals may also be connected pro-
vided that a secure channel can be created 
between the remote tamper-free terminals and the 
local tamper-free terminals. The appointed repre-
sentative for an institution has the duty to period-
ically load the cryptographic parameters from his 
or her smartcard to each of the resident tamper-
free terminals at that institution. This configura-
tion is shown in Fig. 1. 
3. Towards a practical scheme 
In this section we present a practical scheme for 
anonymous and verifiable databases based on the 
Improved Leighton-Micali (ILM) protocol [3]. 
The original Leighton-Micali protocol [2] had an 
inherent flaw which in our context allowed an 
attacker to read data belonging to an individual 
when it was in transit between the institution and 
the individual's terminal. This flaw has subse-
quently been solved and the protocol improved 
Zheng's work [3].1 
Following the requirements of [2, 3], we assume 
that tamper-proof VLSI chips are readily available 
to be incorporated into smartcards and tamper-
free terminals. We also assume that a publicly 
known one-way hash function h exists (which 
may also be replaced with a cryptographically 
strong pseudo-random function). 
When an individual wishes to submit data to an 
institution or to verity existing data held by an 
institution, he or she must interact via a tamper-
free terminal which establishes a connection with 
another tamper-free terminal located at the insti-
tution. Communications between these two ter-
minals must be via a session key which is selected 
by either terminal and is transferred securely to 
IThe work of [3] has recently been published in [9]. 
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Fig. 1. Anonymous individuals and verifiable databases. 
the other .. The session key is then discarded by 
both termmals after the session is over. Newly 
submitted data is assumed to be placed in a tem-
porary location within the institution's database to 
be read, verified and classified by one of the insti-
tution's staff members. Only then can such data 
be committed to the database. In the following, 
we assume that all communications are protected 
against replays (e.g. via timestamps or nonces). 
3.1 Session keys: the ILM protocol 
In the ILM protocol it is assumed that the Trus-
ted Authority holds M secret keys (Xl. ... , X M ). 
Each secret key is chosen uniformly at random by 
the Trusted Authority and is of length k bits. For 
each user i who is enrolled into the system, the 
Trusted Authority selects M random integers (lXl' 
... , IXM) from the interval [1, L], where L is an 
integer? 
The Trusted Authority then employs h to com-
pute Ym = h"m (Xm) for all m = 1, ... , M, where 
hS (X) indicates applying consecutively the func-
2Leighton and Micali recommended the size of M be of the 
order 0 (B 3 logN), where N is the number of users and B is 
the upper-bound on the number of dishonest users [2,9]. 
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tion h on an input X for s times. That is, 
s times 
hS (X) = h ( ... h (h(X)) .. . ). 
Here (1X1> ... , IXM) becomes the public key of indi-
vidual i which is known to all institutions. The 
corresponding secret key (Yl. ... , Y M) is then 
placed by the Trusted Authority into the tamper-
proof chip of the individual's smartcard. The 
smartcard is only delivered to the individual after 
the secret key has been inserted, and hence no 
person has access to the secret keys or the other 
secret parameters within that individual's tamper-
proof chip. 
Assuming that individual i needs to verifY or sub-
mit data to institution j, then their respective ter-
minals must establish a secure channel by way of 
encipherment using key Ki•J • This secure channel 
will afterwards be used to transfer the random 
session key Ks. The crucial requirement at this 
point is that both terminals must establish the 
same key KiJ independently without previous com-
munications. This process can be done as follows 
Computers & Security, Vol. 14, No.5 
[3 ]: 
1. The terminal of individual i must obtain the 
public key (Ph ... , 13M) of institution j. This 
public key can be resident within each tamper-
free terminal or it can be read by the terminal 
from a publicly readable file. 
2. Mter individual i inserts his or her smartcard 
into the terminal, the terminal must provide 
the smartcard with the public key of the insti-
tution j. The tamper-proof chip within the 
smartcard of individual i then computes the 
common key Ki,j as: 
{
h (hOt (Xl) II hOM (XM ) II i II j), 




where (jm = max(am, 13m), m = 1, ... , M and 
II denotes concatenation. 
Note that the tamper-proof chip can easily com-
pute hOm(Xm ) = h I Om-"m I (Ym ) (m = 1, ... , M) and 
thus K,j because it has available the values 
Y m = h"m (Xm) residing in its internal memory. The 
tamper-proof chip of the terminal at the institu-
tion performs symmetric procedures, and thus 
obtains the same key ~,i = K,j [3]. 
In order to aid our subsequent discussions we will 
simplify eq. (1) into 
{
h(X II i IU), 




As before, the k-bit value X is chosen randomly 
by the Trusted Authority where k should be suffi-
ciently large, say k:2:: 100, in order to prevent it 
from an exhaustive search attack [3]. The value X 
is kept secret by the Trusted Authority, and dur-
ing the enrolment of individuals the Trusted 
Authority also injects a copy of X into the chip of 
the smartcard belonging to the individual and into 
that belonging to the local authority at each insti-
tution. Hence, in fact, the value X is common to 
all parties in the system. 
3.2 Anonymity 
In order to provide anonymity to individuals 
within the system, the Trusted Authority must 
create distinct pseudonyms for each user with 
respect to each of the institutions. In order to do 
this each individual i must enrol in-person to the 
Trusted Authority and provide it with some iden-
tification information Pi. The Trusted Authority 
uniformly chooses a unique identity Ii and a 
unique secret value Si, and associates them with 
Pi. It is the duty of the Trusted Authority to keep 
the values (Pi, Ii, Si' SCi) secure, where SCi is 
the unique chip number built into the tamper-
proof chip of the individual's smartcard. The same 
procedure is also observed for the local authority 
of each institution. 
Assuming that each institution has been assigned a 
publicly known identity Bj , the Trusted Authority 
creates the pseudonym Ii,j of the individual with 
identity Ii with respect to Bj as: 
Here we assume that the encoding scheme for the 
identities of individuals Ii and institutions Bj is 
uniform. The key STA is maintained as secret by 
the Trusted Authority. The secret value Si and the 
pseudonyms for an individual are then inserted 
into that individual's chip. Similarly, each institu-
tion is given the respective pseudonym that the 
individual will present to the institution. 
Another secret parameter injected into the 
tamper-proof chips of both the individual Ii,j and 
the institution Bj is a database key Di,j, uniformly 
chosen by the Trusted Authority, This database 
key will be used to create other keys which are 
further used to control access to the database. 
Thus, for example, these created keys can be used 
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to hide passwords of individuals, to encipher the 
access matrix or to encipher the data in the data-
base. In this paper we will use them to encipher 
stored data, although it is clear to the reader that 
other modes of their usage are possible. 
3.3 Data storage 
Within each institution B) data in the database 
concerning individual Ii,j must be stored in such a 
way that only the individual and the institution 
(i.e. its staff) can view the data. Assuming Ri,j 
represents the data of individual Ii,j at institution 
Bj , a key KRiJ must be uniformly chosen by the 
local authority within the institution to be applied 
in order to hide data Ri,j' Bearing in mind that a 
secure DBMS running above a secure operating 
system is crucial for overall system security, there 
are a number of ways in which data can be stored 
in a manner that will make it accessible to users 
only through the key KR'J' One simple method 
through which data can be protected from unwan-
ted disclosures is by way of direct encipherment 
using the above key KR'J (see [10]). 
This encipherment key KR'J must also reside in an 
enciphered form under a key which is available to 
the individual. This key-enciphering key is calcu-




In addition, for each entry in the database belong-
ing to the individual 1;,j a signature or checksum 
[11, 12] must be created to prevent undetected 
changes to the data without the individual's con-
sent. This is achieved by using the values 5i and 5j 
which are in the tamper-proof chips of the indi-
vidual and the institution's local authority, 
respectively. 
One simple way to create such signatures or 
checksums is as follows. When the individual is 
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requested by the institution to verify and approve 
the data Ri,) about the individual to be committed 
into the database, tamper-proof chips of the 
respective parties must generate certain parameters 
as input to some secure signature function sig. 
Thus, the chip belonging to the individual 1;,j 
creates ti ,) = h(R,) II 5 i liB), while the chip 
belonging to the institution's local authority 
creates f.. = h (R· . II 5· II I·) (note that here 'j,' ',j J ',j 
ti ,) =1= 0.;). The two terminals onto which the indi-
vidual and local authority are connected obtain the 
respective values from the chip within the respec-
tive (inserted) smartcards, and then the terminals 
exchange li,j and 0,i over the secure channel estab-
lished previously using the session key. 
Mter receiving ti,j from the individual's terminal, 
the institution's terminal then computes the sig-
nature for the individual's entry. That is, the entry 
for individual Ii,j within the database of institution 
B) is 
where the symbol '{}K' denotes encipherment 
using key K. 
The institution's terminal then sends this com-
plete entry (including the signature) and Ri,) to the 
individual's terminal which re-computes the sig-
nature (if needed, the entry and the signature can 
also be sent by the individual's terminal to a law-
yer who represents the individual). If both sig-
natures are identical, the individual's terminal 
sends an acknowledgement to the terminal at the 
institution. Both terminals then erase the values tiJ 
and 0,i' In this manner, neither the individual nor 
the institution can modify the data illegally, since 
neither ti,) nor 0,i are ever directly available to the 
individual or the institution's staff, respectively. 
Here we have illustrated a simple method for the 
storage of data in an institution's database, focus-
ing on the ease of access to the data from remote 
tamper-free terminals. Other secure data storage 
methods can be devised, and the reader is directed 
Computers & Security, Vol. 14, No.5 
to [10-12] for a more comprehensive discussion 
on this particular issue. 
3.4 Verifiability 
When an individual Ii,j wishes to view his or her 
data Ri,j held at an institution B j the individual 
must use his or her smartcard with a tamper-free 
terminal: 
1. The individual then selects via the tamper-free 
terminal the identity of the institution Bj that 
holds the data the individual wishes to view. 
2. Mter inserting his or her smartcard into the 
tamper-free terminal, the terminal provides the 
smartcard - and thus the chip within - with 
the identity Bj . The individual's terminal must 
also indicate to the institution's tamper-free 
terminal that a session is being requested. The 
institution's terminal then looks up the identity 
Ii,j of the individual. 
3. The individual's chip then computes K,j, while 
the chip within the institution's terminal com-
putes 1<..;,i' As before, K,j = 1<..;,i' 
4. The individual's terminal (or the institution's 
terminal) generates a session key Ks. The ses-
sion key Ks is then exchanged by way of enci-
phering it with Ki,j = 1<..;,i' 
5. The institution's terminal then instructs the 
database system to return the entry {KRi) KE'J' 
{R;,)KR'J' sig(Ri,j, ti,j, ~.i) for individual Ii,j' 
This entry is enciphered using the session key 
Ks and the result is dispatched to the individ-
ual's terminal. 
6. The individual's terminal deciphers the entry 
using the session key K" and the key-encipher-
ing key KEi,j is recreated following eq. (3). The 
individual's terminal then recovers KR . and 
uses it to decipher and present to the indi~idual 
the data Ri,j' The integrity of the data may also 
be verified by way of recreating the signature in 
the manner previously discussed. This would 
involve the institution's terminal re-computing 
~,i and sending it to the individual's terminal 
via a secure channel. 
4. Remarks and conclusion 
In this paper we have extended the notions 
embodied in the Clipper Chip concept towards 
achieving anonymous and verifiable databases. 
The Trusted Authority creates a pseudonym for 
an individual corresponding to each institution 
that holds data about the individual. Hence, an 
individual has a different pseudonym when deal-
ing with each institution. For each individual, the 
Trusted Authority issues a tamper-proof smart-
card containing that individuals's set of pseudo-
nyms and other cryptographic parameters. The 
database at each institution is assumed to be man-
aged by a trusted DBMS which can be used by 
staff members at the site only through a number 
of tamper-free terminals. These tamper-free ter-
minals represent the only valid access points to 
the database. A number of tamper-free terminals 
are also provided at the site for use by individuals 
in the public, while remote tamper-free terminals 
may also be connected, provided a secure channel 
can be created between the remote tamper-free 
terminals and the local tamper-free terminals. 
When an individual wishes to submit data to an 
institution or to verity existing data held by an 
institution, he or she must interact via a tamper-
free terminal which establishes a connection with 
another tamper-free terminal located at the insti-
tution. Communications between these two ter-
minals must be via a session key which is selected 
by either terminal and is transferred securely to 
the other. The session key is then discarded by 
both terminals after the session is over. 
The security of the scheme relies on the tamper-
resistance of the chips and the randomness of the 
one-way hash function. To reduce the risk of 
abusing stolen chips, authentication of a chip's 
owner should be conducted by such means as 
user password [3]. In its current stage the scheme 
does not pretend to cover all possible points of 
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attack, and clearly it does not provide a balanced 
burden of trust between an individual and an 
institution. Mter all, it is the institution that main-
tains the database containing the individual's pri-
vate information. In practice it is difficult to 
prevent an institution from creating an informal 
and separate 'black list' database containing 'off-
the-record' information upon which in reality it 
bases its decisions concerning a given individual. 
Other security measures are also required to pre-
vent staff members of an institution from sharing 
data illegally with other institutions (e.g. manually 
copying onto a removable hard disk). The scheme 
in this paper represents a first step towards pro-
viding a practical mechanism in the face of an 
emerging new technology. 
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